Unit 42: Threat Brief: Salesloft Drift Integration Used To Compromise Salesforce Instances

Sep 2, 2025

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Source URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-compromised-salesforce-instances/
Source: Unit 42
Title: Threat Brief: Salesloft Drift Integration Used To Compromise Salesforce Instances

Feedly Summary: This Threat Brief discusses observations on a campaign leveraging Salesloft Drift integration to exfiltrate data via compromised OAuth credentials.
The post Threat Brief: Salesloft Drift Integration Used To Compromise Salesforce Instances appeared first on Unit 42.

AI Summary and Description: Yes

Summary: The text discusses a security threat involving the use of compromised OAuth credentials through the Salesloft Drift integration to exfiltrate data from Salesforce instances. This is pertinent to professionals in information security, particularly those focused on the vulnerabilities associated with integrations and credential misuse.

Detailed Description: This Threat Brief highlights a significant security campaign that exploits OAuth credentials, a widely used standard for access delegation, through the integration of Salesloft and Drift in Salesforce environments. This situation emphasizes the critical challenges related to identity and access management, particularly in the context of SaaS applications.

Key points include:

– **Campaign Overview**: The threat actors are using Salesloft’s Drift integration as a vector to compromise Salesforce instances, showcasing a sophisticated method of data exfiltration.

– **Compromised OAuth Credentials**: The use of OAuth, which is often seen as a security measure, is subverted here. This suggests that organizations relying heavily on OAuth for access management need to reassess their security postures.

– **Implications for SaaS Security**: This incident highlights vulnerabilities within SaaS integrations, pointing to the need for enhanced monitoring and control mechanisms to mitigate risks associated with third-party applications.

– **Best Practices for Organizations**:
– Regularly review and audit third-party integrations to ensure they have the necessary security controls.
– Implement stringent monitoring for unusual access patterns, particularly when OAuth is used.
– Educate employees about the risks of compromised credentials and encourage immediate reporting of suspicious activities.

This threat serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in securing modern cloud applications and underscores the importance of a comprehensive security strategy that includes both preventative measures and incident response plans.

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