Source URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/introducing-toymaker-an-initial-access-broker/
Source: Cisco Talos Blog
Title: Introducing ToyMaker, an Initial Access Broker working in cahoots with double extortion gangs
Feedly Summary: Cisco Talos discovered a sophisticated attack on critical infrastructure by ToyMaker and Cactus, using the LAGTOY backdoor to orchestrate a relentless double extortion scheme.
AI Summary and Description: Yes
**Summary:**
The text provides an in-depth analysis of a sophisticated cyberattack on critical infrastructure conducted by threat actors identified as “ToyMaker” and “Cactus.” This analysis is particularly relevant for professionals in security and compliance, highlighting the methods used in initial compromises, the tools employed, and the sequence of malicious activities, along with the implications for threat modeling and mitigation strategies.
**Detailed Description:**
The provided content details a coordinated cyber-attack on a critical infrastructure enterprise, detailing the methods used by multiple threat actors. The primary focus is on the tactics employed by ToyMaker and how they exploited vulnerabilities to gain initial access, then handed off the compromised access to Cactus, a ransomware group.
**Key Highlights:**
– **Initial Access and Tools Used:**
– The Initial Access Broker (IAB) known as ToyMaker utilizes dual-use tools such as remote administration and file transfer utilities to infiltrate networks.
– ToyMaker deploys a custom backdoor named “LAGTOY” to extract credentials and establish further access.
– **Sequence of Events:**
– A timeline detailing activities ranging from initial access through credential enumeration to malware deployment reflects the structured nature of the attack:
– **Day of Activity:** Various stages including user enumeration, credential extraction, backdoor implantation, and finally, handover to the Cactus ransomware group.
– **Malware Analysis:**
– LAGTOY is described as a potent tool allowing ToyMaker to hold a foothold in the victim’s network. It performs reconnaissance and can execute commands remotely while transferring stolen credentials.
– It exhibits unique command and control communication techniques, including anti-debugging measures to evade detection.
– **Cactus Group Operations:**
– After receiving access from ToyMaker, Cactus conducted extensive reconnaissance and exfiltration practices using both bespoke tools and publicly available software.
– The group engaged in self-propagation throughout the network while employing techniques that enabled them to maintain long-term access.
– **Data Exfiltration and Ransomware Deployment:**
– Data exfiltration was performed using tools such as 7zip and curl, with the actors actively cleaning traces of their activities to avoid detection.
– **Operational Security (OpSec):**
– The Cactus group demonstrated solid operational security by implementing measures to restrict access to critical components, making the attack complex and harder to trace.
– **Mitigation Recommendations:**
– Cisco Secure products are suggested as defense mechanisms against such threats, emphasizing the importance of a layered security approach incorporating endpoint protection, secure access, and threat intelligence.
– **Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):**
– A list of hashes, IP addresses associated with the attackers, and specific commands used throughout the breach process illustrates practical steps organizations can take to identify and mitigate similar threats.
The analysis concludes with a pointed suggestion on the need for evolving threat models to account for such compartmentalized yet connected threats, further emphasizing the necessity for compliance and security professionals to adapt their frameworks continuously. The depth of insight into the methodologies utilized in these sophisticated attacks provides invaluable knowledge for enhancing security postures within organizations.