The Register: Governments can’t seem to stop asking for secret backdoors

Source URL: https://www.theregister.com/2025/03/03/opinion_e2ee/
Source: The Register
Title: Governments can’t seem to stop asking for secret backdoors

Feedly Summary: Cut off one head and 100 grow back? Decapitation may not be the way to go
Opinion With Apple pulling the plug on at-rest end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for UK users, and Signal threatening to pull out of Sweden if that government demands E2EE backdoors, it’s looking bleak.…

AI Summary and Description: Yes

Summary: The text discusses the implications of encryption policies and practices, particularly the challenges posed by end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and the risks surrounding potential government backdoors. It emphasizes the importance of open-source encryption solutions as a way to safeguard user privacy against both criminal misuse and governmental interference.

Detailed Description: The text highlights critical issues regarding encryption, privacy, and security in the digital age. The main points are:

– **Government Interference**: The text mentions Apple’s decision to discontinue at-rest E2EE for UK users and Signal’s threat to withdraw from Sweden in response to proposed encryption-busting laws. This reflects a broader concern about governments attempting to undermine encryption in the name of security.

– **Inherent Flaws in Legislation**: It argues that enforcing backdoors in encryption can lead to vulnerabilities that are easily exploited. If users and criminals can find and utilize stronger, uncrippled encryption methods, efforts to implement backdoors would ultimately fail.

– **Secrecy and Its Challenges**: The discussion points out that even if access demands are kept secret, the integrity of encrypted communications would be compromised if the underlying mathematics cannot support such changes.

– **Local Control of Encryption**: The text suggests that users can protect themselves by utilizing non-crippled software, running encryption locally, or using independent private services. This empowerment is particularly critical for innocent users who may be most at risk from malicious entities.

– **Advocacy for Open Source**: It stresses that open-source software is the best defense against hidden vulnerabilities and backdoors. Since the code is publicly accessible, any tampering would be immediately recognizable, thus allowing for greater security.

– **Proton Mail as a Model**: The mention of Proton Mail serves as a case study in effective end-to-end encryption where user privacy is respected since only encrypted messages are stored, and threat vectors are minimized.

– **Community and Collaboration**: The discussion calls for the open-source community to lead the effort in creating secure, attack-resilient frameworks that protect user privacy without compromising system integrity.

– **Conclusion on Encryption Policies**: It concludes that attempts to segment encryption into “safe for good people” and “unsafe for bad people” are fundamentally flawed; a comprehensive, open approach to encryption is necessary for true security and privacy.

The text is relevant for professionals focused on security, privacy, and encryption legislation, particularly in understanding the interplay between government regulations and technological integrity, as well as the necessity of promoting robust security practices through open-source initiatives.