Source URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/gcp-data-destruction-via-cloud-build/
Source: Cisco Talos Blog
Title: Google Cloud Platform Data Destruction via Cloud Build
Feedly Summary: A technical overview of Cisco Talos’ investigations into Google Cloud Platform Cloud Build, and the threat surface posed by the storage permission family.
AI Summary and Description: Yes
**Summary:**
The text discusses security vulnerabilities associated with Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Cloud Build, particularly as revealed in public research by Orca Security and further explored by Cisco Talos. The research identifies significant attack vectors within Cloud Build’s default service account permissions that can be exploited for malicious actions, such as supply chain attacks. It emphasizes the necessity for cloud administrators to enforce robust security practices such as the principle of least privilege and manual approval processes to mitigate potential threats.
**Detailed Description:**
The analysis covers a range of critical security issues linked to GCP’s Cloud Build service, including insights into how attackers can exploit the features of this CI/CD tool. The text highlights the following major points:
– **Supply Chain Threats:**
– Attackers can leverage default service account permissions in Cloud Build to compromise security and potentially engage in supply chain attacks.
– The “Bad.Build” attack vector allows malicious users to gain insights into project permissions and execute GCP commands if they can create and run Cloud Build jobs.
– **Research Insights:**
– Orca Security’s findings indicate serious vulnerabilities where a compromised Cloud Build service can potentially manipulate application behavior via malicious code.
– Cisco Talos confirmed the viability of these attack paths while cautioning that the capabilities in question do not inherently represent flawed design but highlight the risks when default permissions are misconfigured.
– **Operational and Defensive Recommendations:**
– Establish anomaly detection models targeting unusual actions by the default Cloud Build service account.
– Implement the principle of least privilege by creating service accounts with limited permissions tailored to specific needs.
– Require manual approvals for builds triggered by pull requests to reduce unauthorized accesses.
– Monitor Operations Logs for potentially malicious activities tied to these service accounts.
– **Configurations and Best Practices:**
– Recommendations include utilizing Google’s configurations and security features (like Soft Delete) to enhance protection against potential data destruction or ransom scenarios.
– Encourage configurations that limit automatic build triggers and adopt stringent access controls to secure CI/CD processes.
– **Practical Implications:**
– Cloud administrators are advised to conduct thorough audits of permissions and regularly exercise vigilant monitoring.
– Security analysts should familiarize themselves with the potential threats identified in the research to develop mitigation strategies and respond effectively to incidents.
Overall, the text provides vital insights for security professionals focusing on cloud and software security, underscoring the importance of proactive security measures against the evolving landscape of threats in CI/CD environments.